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NO. 36 SEPTEMBER 2019 Introduction 
Mozambique Still At Risk 
Despite the Peace Process, A Serious Crisis Looms 
Melanie Müller and Judith Vorrath 
In early August 2019 the president of Mozambique and the leader of the largest oppo-
sition party signed a new peace agreement. This has revived the peace process between 
the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Mozambique Liberation 
Front (FRELIMO), which has been in power since 1994. Great challenges remain, such 
as the disarmament and reintegration of RENAMO fighters. 
Furthermore, new trouble spots have emerged: Since October 2017, a wave of vio-
lence has cost the lives of well over 300 people in Cabo Delgado Province. Although 
“Islamic State” (IS) has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, the motives 
and structures of the group responsible remain unclear. Its occurrence points to pro-
found social cleavages and alienation between the population and the political elite. 
At the same time, the north of Mozambique has become a hub for the illicit economy. 
Criminal transactions are above all symptoms of state neglect and extensive impunity. 
Experience from other conflict regions shows that this constellation can have fatal 
consequences. For this reason, international actors including the German govern-
ment should press for rapid and far-reaching measures that go beyond the official 
peace process. 
 
The civil war between FRELIMO and 
RENAMO lasted fifteen years and cost 
the lives of about one million people. It 
officially ended in 1992 with the Rome 
General Peace Accord (GPA). This appeared 
to resolve a proxy war of the Cold War, 
which had pitched the liberation move-
ment FRELIMO with its links to the Soviet 
Union against RENAMO, whose main sup-
porters were South Africa and the USA. The 
subsequent process of democratisation was 
long regarded as successful. RENAMO took 
part in most elections as a political party 
during a longer period of calm. In 2013, 
however, the conflict broke out again after 
FRELIMO had been repeatedly accused of 
electoral manipulation. 
Yet the causes run deeper. Ultimately, 
the elite pact based on the Rome GPA 
crumbled because FRELIMO was able to 
prevent the development of a more in-
clusive political system by controlling state 
structures. The peace process has pro-
gressed once again since a ceasefire agree-
ment in December 2016. In February 2018, 
Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi and 
RENAMO opposition leader Afonso Dhla-
kama made significant progress in nego- 
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tiating a peace agreement. Dhlakama died a 
short time later, but his successor Ossufo 
Momade maintained the course of a peace-
ful settlement. The new peace agreement 
was finally signed in August 2019, after par-
liament had already passed an amnesty law. 
Two aspects in particular are key for 
implementation. First, the deconcentration 
of political power, which is to be achieved 
primarily by decentralising administrative 
structures. Parliament has already adopted 
corresponding measures, including the 
election of governors by majority voting, 
when they had previously been appointed 
directly by the central government. How-
ever, whether these measures actually 
facilitate more participation for the oppo-
sition parties ultimately depends on the 
credibility of the electoral processes. 
The disarmament and integration of 
RENAMO fighters into the Mozambican 
security apparatus, as stipulated in the 
peace agreement, is also at stake – a par-
ticularly delicate task. It was essential that 
Nyusi and Momade were able to agree on 
setting up a military commission to deal 
with the technical issues of the integration 
process. They also arranged further con-
crete steps towards demilitarisation, which 
has already begun. 
Although such progress points to a posi-
tive development, Mozambique’s stability 
remains at risk. If civil society and the op-
position accuse FRELIMO of manipulating 
the registration of candidates for the parlia-
mentary and presidential elections in July 
2019, this is evidence of continuing mis-
trust. What is particularly alarming, how-
ever, is that other sources of insecurity have 
opened up alongside the old lines of conflict.  
Diffuse Extremism and 
New Violence in the North 
In October 2017 a police station in Mocím-
boa da Praia was attacked. This event is 
commonly seen as the beginning of a new 
wave of violence in Mozambique. Until 
early 2017, acts of violence could predomi-
nantly be attributed to RENAMO, and took 
place mostly in the centre of the country. 
During the past two years though, assaults 
and killings have been recorded regularly 
in the northernmost province of Cabo Del-
gado. Initially, it was mostly attackers and 
security forces that died during clashes, 
but in 2018 and 2019 most casualties were 
civilians. The common pattern that has 
become established is for lightly armed 
groups to attack villages and partially or 
completely burn them down. In the more 
than 100 attacks on civilians, there have 
been repeated beheadings, kidnappings and 
rapes. Exact figures are not available, but 
conservative estimates put the number of 
civilians killed as of July 2019 at over 280. 
Security forces reacted to the violence 
with harsh, sometimes arbitrary actions. 
After the first attack, in which the police 
temporarily lost control of the town of 
Mocímboa da Praia, hundreds of people 
were arrested, including many who were 
apparently innocent. This practice seemed 
to continue: of the 189 people brought to 
justice in Pemba in October 2018 for vari-
ous offences connected with the wave of 
violence, more than half had to be released 
for lack of evidence. During their counter-
operations, security forces closed or de-
stroyed mosques and reportedly killed 
dozens of people. Their actions are seen by 
many as a reason for the escalation of vio-
lence from 2018 onwards. 
The government now restricts access to 
the region, apparently to prevent negative 
reporting. For this reason also, knowledge 
of the group held responsible for the vio-
lence remains sketchy. Internationally it is 
often called Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaa (ASWJ) 
or Ansar al Sunna. Locals call the group Al 
Shabaab (‘the youth’), although no system-
atic links with the group of the same name 
in Somalia are known to exist. It is said to 
have an ideology that is directed against the 
state and has Islamic fundamentalist traits. 
However, the group’s motives remain un-
clear, especially since it has not released 
public statements on them. Along with 
state institutions such as educational facil-
ities, its actions have also targeted from 
early on the officially recognised Islamic 
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structures in the north, which it rejects as 
being too close to the state. Even though 
some of its leaders have been identified, 
the organisation does not seem to have a 
central command structure, consisting 
instead of relatively autonomous cells of 
10 to 20 people. A total of between 350 and 
1,500 men are thought to be organised in 
these. 
Since June 2019 IS has claimed responsi-
bility for several attacks in Cabo Delgado. 
Many regional experts doubt that there 
is a close connection, and assume, that IS is 
free-riding by making use of existing struc-
tures. Local and regional factors in particu-
lar appear to have contributed to the expan-
sion of the group. Overall it seems that the 
Mozambican Al Shabaab is part of a region-
ally intertwined Islamist extremism which 
has cross-border connections, especially to 
Tanzania. The group’s radicalisation is also 
founded on various cleavages in Mozam-
bique, which have deepened. 
The Symptoms of a 
Growing Divide 
In Cabo Delgado, a largely Muslim province, 
Islamic fundamentalism is not a new phe-
nomenon. However, preachers appear to 
have intensified their activities since 2015, 
specifically recruiting mostly young men. 
Some were lured into new mosques with 
the offer of loans, and were probably only 
later mobilised for acts of violence. Accord-
ing to reports, young people were also 
given scholarships to Koran schools and 
sent to military training in East African 
countries. 
There are many reasons why such re-
cruitment has been successful, including 
local tensions. Most of those mobilised from 
2015 onwards probably belonged to the 
Mwani ethnic group; the Mwani feel dis-
criminated against compared to the Makonde 
group, which dominates the province. 
Others came from neighbouring Tanzania 
or other East African states. Local ethnic 
groups often feel a stronger connection to 
southern Tanzania than to regions of their 
own country. The rejection of established 
Islamic scholars points to a generational 
conflict. The majority of those recruited for 
military cells are young men affected by 
unemployment and marginalisation. 
Moreover, almost all assessments of the 
acts of violence in Cabo Delgado refer to a 
connection with the exploitation of natural 
resources. The region is rich in raw ma-
terials: new oil and gas deposits have been 
discovered in recent years. Yet the award of 
concessions to companies has driven parts 
of the local population off their land. Only 
a small proportion of the profits from the 
extraction of raw materials flows back into 
the structurally weak north. 
Cabo Delgado Province, located far from 
the capital Maputo, has long been neglected 
by the central government. This has led to 
high poverty rates, poor infrastructure and 
a lack of access to social services. FRELIMO 
has continuously lost support in Cabo Del-
gado, but RENAMO is not necessarily re-
garded as an alternative there either. 
The wave of violence is therefore also an 
expression of tensions between the coun-
try’s north and south. The harsh response 
of the Mozambican security forces to the 
violence seems to have further alienated 
the population from the state. It has also 
fuelled rumours in the north that the gov-
ernment and international companies are 
exploiting (or even causing) the insecurity 
to bring in foreign private security com-
panies to protect the gas deposits discovered 
off the coast of Cabo Delgado in 2010. This 
interpretation may seem exaggerated, but 
it shows the extent of mistrust towards the 
central government. The illicit economy 
flourishing in the north has also repeatedly 
been associated with the wave of violence. 
Illicit Trade and Organised Crime 
Mocímboa da Praia and surrounding areas 
have become a hub of illegal activities and 
organised crime (OC). International atten-
tion has recently focused on the extremists’ 
alleged income from poaching, and the 
illicit trade in timber and rubies in Cabo 
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Delgado. But there are doubts as to how 
relevant these profits are to the group, 
especially when compared to donations or 
rather protection money. There is little to 
suggest that the group, with its loose struc-
ture and simple means, has managed to 
reap high profits, let alone control illicit 
trade flows or routes. Moreover, some of 
these routes are long established, inter alia 
to transport drugs to Mozambique and on 
to South Africa and Europe. Heroin, for 
example, is usually brought from Pakistan 
to the East African coast by seaworthy 
motorised ships (dhows) and stored on land, 
where it is repackaged and transported 
onwards. Due to its largely uncontrolled 
coastal sections, northern Mozambique is 
an attractive transit point. Drugs are brought 
into the country at smaller landing sites 
or beaches as well as via container freight 
traffic, in particular through the port of 
Nacala. Like the port in Pemba, this port is 
also important for the illicit trade in timber 
and wildlife products such as ivory, all of 
which are mainly transported to Asia. 
Some routes have also shifted to north-
ern Mozambique because neighbouring 
countries such as Tanzania have intensified 
controls. Above all, however, the shaping 
of the illicit economy in the north is a 
symptom of the area’s neglect by the state, 
the prevailing impunity, and the close 
intertwining of the legal and illegal econ-
omies. These conditions are not to be found 
in Cabo Delgado alone. However, in this 
region – at the border with Tanzania – 
they are concentrated and reinforced as in 
a pressure-cooker. 
State actors are not completely absent, 
but in fact exert specific influence at eco-
nomically important points. Especially in 
heroin trafficking and the illicit timber 
trade, the leaders and main beneficiaries 
of organised networks are often politically 
well-connected and protected. For example, 
the bulk trade of heroin intended for transit 
has long been controlled by a few actors of 
South Asian origin. They have the necessary 
international connections and at the same 
time operate various legal enterprises, espe-
cially in northern Mozambique. Mohamed 
Bachir Suleman, on whom the USA has im-
posed sanctions since 2010 for drug traf-
ficking, is regarded as the central figure in 
heroin smuggling. In Mozambique, how-
ever, he himself and leading figures operat-
ing under him have never been charged for 
links to drug trafficking. 
Thus far, no high-ranking figure has 
been prosecuted in the country, and hardly 
any heroin has been confiscated. Yet the 
authorities in South Africa have repeatedly 
discovered heroin in cargoes of goods from 
Mozambique. This suggests either that con-
fiscated heroin in Mozambique is being 
misappropriated or else that inspections are 
impeded from the outset. In their report, 
authors of the Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organized Crime refer to 
the numerous links between FRELIMO and 
the drug traffickers in question. Protection 
from checks in the port of Nacala or on the 
road to the south enables the latter to pur-
sue criminal business under cover of legal 
commercial activities. 
Similar structures exist in the illicit trade 
in timber and ivory, which mostly Asian 
networks conduct on a large scale. Officially 
licensed Chinese companies apparently 
export large quantities of timber illegally. 
According to projections by the Environ-
mental Investigation Agency, in 2012 up to 
48 percent of Chinese timber imports from 
Mozambique were illegal. The report also 
revealed the close ties between Chinese 
timber companies and Mozambican offi-
cials. Similarly, the activities of the Shui-
dong Syndicate in Mozambique were exposed 
in 2017 as a result of undercover research. 
This network had increasingly smuggled 
ivory into Asia via the port of Pemba, 
where, according to a Chinese trader, the 
network was free to act because everyone 
had been bought. In 2015, 1.3 tonnes of 
ivory and rhino horn that had been dis-
covered in the possession of a Chinese man 
in Maputo disappeared from police head-
quarters following confiscation – obviously 
with the help of several officials. 
Naturally, illicit trade is subject to con-
stant change. More recently, loosely organ-
ised networks also seem to be active in 
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heroin trafficking. In strategically less rele-
vant places, non-state actors also exercise 
authority. Some of these figures play an 
important role in the illicit trade through 
the north and are influential locally. Activ-
ities such as illegal logging or mining for 
gemstones provide employment for the 
population and some investment in local 
infrastructure. According to the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime, criminal groups are 
also benefiting from the precarious situa-
tion created by the devastating cyclones 
that happened in spring, and are increas-
ingly recruiting among the population of 
the affected areas. 
This constellation presents multiple 
dangers. “Al Shabaab” in the north prob-
ably generates part of its income via the 
illicit economy, but so far it does not 
appear to be linked to organised criminal 
networks. If it manages to expand its in-
fluence, this could change. And as else-
where, increasing competition can lead 
to violent disputes over route control. 
Corruption and Patronage 
The starting point for action against traf-
ficking and organised crime is not primarily 
in the north. Internationally well-connected 
illegal businesses that generate high profits 
are mainly protected by criminal-political 
connections in the country’s centre. In this 
nexus of protective arrangements, money 
has repeatedly flowed to high-ranking 
FRELIMO officials. The system that was built 
by the former liberation movement to re-
main in power is certainly comprehensive. 
In the most recent survey of the Afroba-
rometer, just 27 percent of respondents said 
that they perceived a difference between 
FRELIMO and the state. Mozambique also 
ranks 158th out of the 180 countries listed 
on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2018. Corruption is also 
the determining factor in the biggest debt 
scandal in the country’s history. In 2016, it 
was revealed that Mozambique had taken 
on $2 billion in officially undeclared debt 
through state guarantees. The loans granted 
to three Mozambican companies came from 
Credit Suisse and the Russian VTB. Accord-
ing to a parliamentary commission’s inves-
tigation, this borrowing violated a variety 
of national laws. An independent audit by 
Kroll Associates revealed that the funds 
were to be used to buy boats for coastal pro-
tection and to build up a fleet for tuna fish-
ing. The audit showed that the companies 
could not implement the projects and that 
a number of products were not delivered 
although invoices had been issued for them. 
The whereabouts of 500 million US dollars 
are still unclear. 
Current findings suggest that both some 
bank executives and stakeholders on the 
Mozambican side benefited directly from 
the deal through illegal and undeclared 
kickback payments. The then Finance Min-
ister Manuel Chang is said to have received 
seven million US dollars for his involvement. 
The United States has issued arrest warrants 
against him and seven other people. He is 
currently in custody in South Africa, await-
ing a decision as to whether he should be 
extradited to the USA or Mozambique. 
In Mozambique, the trial against other 
FRELIMO masterminds is eagerly awaited. 
A total of 21 defendants are on trial, includ-
ing one of the sons of Armando Guebuza, 
Mozambique’s former president, and two 
high-ranking members of Mozambique’s 
secret service. Given FRELIMO’s far-reaching 
entanglement in the debt scandal, President 
Nyusi is in a difficult position. Since he 
needs the support of his party for the next 
steps in the peace process, dealing harshly 
with the masterminds of the debt scandal 
is politically risky. At the same time there is 
enormous pressure both in the country – 
especially in the run-up to the elections in 
October 2019 – and from abroad to deal 
effectively with the scandal. 
More than Warning Signals: 
Fast Political Action is Needed 
The signing of the peace agreement in early 
August was an important step. However, 
throughout the preceding peace process, 
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various problems have intensified. The cir-
cumstances behind the wave of violence in 
Cabo Delgado, and the intertwined nature 
of the illicit economy, offer disturbing par-
allels to other conflict theatres where far-
reaching destabilisation has already become 
a reality. Mozambique may also well be a 
case of ‘too late for an early warning’. This 
makes it all the more crucial to take coun-
termeasures. 
First, fundamental reforms must be ini-
tiated as soon as possible. The peace process 
cannot be confined to an elite pact between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO. Instead, govern-
ance must be improved and the democratic 
space expanded. A reform of the judicial 
system and the security sector is essential 
to resolve the entanglement of public and 
private interests and to address massive 
violations, as in the context of the debt 
scandal. These kinds of reforms take time, 
but they should be set out in the key 
aspects of the peace process. 
Given the high level of donor depend-
ence, President Nyusi is under pressure to 
ease the close ties between his party and 
state institutions. Apparently, the party’s 
connections to certain heads of criminal 
networks have been loosened, at least to 
some extent. In the timber sector, there are 
tentative reform efforts and a Memoran-
dum of Understanding with China aimed 
at stopping illegal logging has been signed. 
Germany and the EU should increase the 
pressure on the Mozambican government 
to tackle fundamental reforms as soon as 
possible. The personal envoy to Mozam-
bique appointed by the UN Secretary-
General in July 2019 can be a partner in 
this process. 
Although about half of the population 
may no longer feel represented by the two 
major parties, it is essential for Mozam-
bique to hold credible elections in October 
2019. However, these are the beginning of a 
political process, not its end. The guarantee 
of freedom of expression and freedom of 
the press, which were restricted by a law 
adopted in July 2018, is key. 
Second, new responses urgently need to 
be found against the wave of violence in 
the north. However, these must not be lim-
ited to repressive measures or confined only 
to Cabo Delgado. The Mozambican and 
British governments signed a declaration in 
May 2019 expressing their intention to co-
operate militarily to counter the extremists. 
Apart from that, the security forces should 
above all ensure that the population is 
better protected, rather than confine them-
selves to securing facilities for profitable gas 
production. Otherwise there is a risk that 
vigilante groups, which have already been 
set up in local communities, will increas-
ingly take justice into their own hands. 
At this point, it seems rather unrealistic 
for law enforcement authorities to take 
more targeted action against leaders of 
the movement that are active in the north. 
Given the group’s decentralised nature, 
channels of communication should be 
explored as well as options to allow less 
radical members to leave. The govern-
ment’s cooperation with the Islamic Coun-
cil of Mozambique, which is intended to 
counter radicalisation in the north, may 
be a first deviation from the harsh actions 
of the security forces. Yet the Council is a 
problematic partner as it is part of the con-
flict constellation. It would be important to 
hold comprehensive dialogues with local 
communities and civil society, which spe-
cifically take into account the problems of 
young people. There also needs to be trust-
building between the police and citizens. 
Last but not least, the government must 
gain more detailed knowledge of the ex-
tremists’ organisational structure in order 
to develop a more sophisticated strategy for 
Cabo Delgado. 
Concrete information is also necessary 
for effective action against the illicit trade, 
which has thus far financed extremists only 
to a limited extent, but has overall caused 
massive economic and political damage to 
Mozambique. 
The political influence of criminal net-
works must be curbed, for example by 
making the financing of political parties 
and election campaigns more transparent. 
In the short term, significant individual 
cases of corruption should at least be made 
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public to create a certain pressure to act. 
The debt scandal shows that law enforce-
ment and justice abroad can play an influ-
ential role as well. 
Mozambique’s already difficult situation 
has been exacerbated by the damage caused 
by the cyclones this year. To improve the 
socioeconomic situation of the population 
in the north and the overall economic crisis, 
gas production must be successful. How-
ever, it is inevitable that the revenues – 
which can only be expected from 2023 on-
wards – will need to be used to repay 
debts. Germany and the EU could pick up 
on requests by civil society that repayments 
of the money misappropriated in the debt 
scandal flow directly into a fund for financ-
ing development projects in the country. 
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